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Abstract Terrorist threat prevention and counteraction require timely detection of
hostile plans. However, adversary efforts at concealment and other challenges in-
volved in monitoring terrorist organizations may impede timely intelligence acqui-
sition or interpretation. This study develops an approach to analyzing technological
means rather than content of communications produced within the social networks
comprising covert organizations, and shows how it can be applied towards detecting
terrorist attack precursors. We find that differential usage patterns of hi-tech versus
low-tech communication solutions could reveal significant information about organi-
zational activities, which may be further used to detect signals of impending terrorist
attacks. (Such potential practical utility of our method is supported by the detailed
empirical analysis of available al Qaeda communications.) The described approach
thus provides a common framework for utilizing diverse activity records from het-
erogeneous sources as well as contributes new tools for their rapid analysis aimed at
better informing operational and policy decision-making.
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1 Introduction
Terrorist threat prevention and counteraction require timely detection of hostile plans,
but the challenges involved in monitoring terrorist organizations impede these efforts.
Authorities need ways to identify attack preparations and other hostile operations
among noisy, incomplete, and heterogeneous communications “chatter” as well as
other activity traces obtained by means ranging from electronic intercepts to human
agents. Attack precursors must also be identified despite attempts by terrorist orga-
nizations to conceal their activities and spread disinformation. This work presents a
method for detecting early-warning signals of attacks and demonstrates its potential
practical utility by analyzing available al Qaeda communications.
The approach described here is based on the analysis of terrorist organizations and,
in particular, of what their communications technology choices may reveal about the
ongoing social network dynamics and developing threats. The resulting method for
early detection of impending threat signals uses multi-source intelligence to generate
potentially actionable indicators of upcoming attacks without relying on the con-
tent of communications, which is often unavailable in a timely manner. Rather, the
method is based only on studying the relative types and usages of enabling technolo-
gies involved. Al Qaeda communications analysis is used to explicitly illustrate this
approach.
Our findings identify consistent early warning signals generated by low-tech
communications—such as meetings, couriers, coded letters, and other physical
interactions—but not by hi-tech ones, when analyzed against the baseline of all avail-
able communications technology use records over time. This paper describes the ap-
proach and the underlying signals-analysis model, applies them to available al Qaeda
communication records, presents the ensuing empirical findings, and finally discusses
how such methods may be relevant to real-time intelligence analysis aimed at pre-
venting attacks. These results thus contribute further understanding of and offer new
analytical tools to organization, social network, and counterterrorism studies.
2 Organization theory and terrorist communications
2.1 Organizations as social networks that manifest themselves via communications
This study views organizations as social networks interacting through communica-
tions in order to pursue missions in diverse and often hostile environments. Orga-
nizations need networks to perform tasks as well as to direct, coordinate, and con-
trol actions—which are functions that typically involve communications. Individuals,
groups, or other such social units comprising an organization represent network nodes
and their communications manifest dynamic network links. Organization’s structure
and activity thus emerge via communications over time (Taylor and Van Every 2000)
as nodes interact with one another and with their environment in mission context.
Missions refer to the nature and purpose of work that organizations do, and environ-
ments are where missions take place. Environments incorporate specific physical, ge-
ographic and technological as well as cultural, political, economic, institutional and
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other social aspects that affect organizational abilities and survival (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967; March and Simon 1993; Katzenstein et al. 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et
al. 2003; Scott and Davis 2007). Hostile environments involve opponents who seek
to destroy their target organizations, leading the targets to adopt network designs and
technology strategies fit for survival (Drozdova 2008).
Network organizations use technology to communicate and perform work in their
environments (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Burt 1992; Powell 1990; Podolny and Page
1998; Scott and Davis 2007). While all organizations use technology, the relation-
ships among tasks, network structures, environments, and technology choices estab-
lish particular abilities and communication patterns. The technologies used in net-
works enable or restrict connectivity, resource allocation, information flows, and
action traceability. Thus, as traceability of social networks and their activities vary
based on the choice of communication technologies, the latter may help reveal or con-
ceal network organizations’ structure and behavior. This work explores how different
communications technology choices manifest activity dynamics of the underlying so-
cial network. The work builds upon key findings about terrorist and other subversive
organizations, whose clandestine missions in hostile environments result in character-
istic social network designs and technology utilization patterns that, in turn, could be
used to elucidate information about organizations’ activities (Drozdova 2008, 2009).
2.2 Communication technologies
The technologies that organizations choose both enable and constrain their social
networks (Dunbar and Starbuck 2006). For this analysis, communication technology
broadly refers to means of social interaction. Different specific means, such as “meet-
ing in person” or “using the Internet”, reflect different technology types. Choices can
be direct when different technologies are available or indirect when only one tech-
nology is available but not communicating remains an option. A common (“typical”)
organizational activity baseline can be established by analyzing different technology
choices and uses in different situations over time. Then, signals indicating changes in
activity can be detected by measuring behavior deviations against this baseline.
Viewing communication technologies on a continuum—from older and simpler
“low-tech” to the more advanced “hi-tech”—provides a common framework for com-
bined analysis of different communication methods. Beyond shorthand, these tech-
nology categories reflect contrasting traceability characteristics that can reveal or-
ganizational activity and underlying social networks (Drozdova 2008). Generally,
low-tech relies on physical interactions between people, whereas hi-tech involves
technological infrastructures that extend organizations’ reach independent of people
and distance. More specifically:
“Low-tech” or “low-traceability” (LT) communication technologies tend to be
technologically simple, yet robust, and rely on people and physical objects for limited
transactions. Typically, they are not scalable to large networks, but neither are their
uses easily traceable. These technologies include courier and face-to-face communi-
cations, handwritten notes, regular mail, physical transactions, improvised techniques
and manually-operated equipment—the use of which creates no automatic or endur-
ing traces and typically requires inside knowledge to track any detectable elements
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in their social context. Such easy-to-use fail-safe technologies are largely indepen-
dent of (traceable) infrastructure requirements and so support organizational node
self-sufficiency, while reducing network connectivity and traceability.
“Hi-tech” or “high-traceability” (HT) communication technologies, in contrast,
help increase organizations’ connectivity, facilitate extended organizations, and effi-
ciently support multiple transactions as well as action traceability across networks.
These comprise advanced and typically (relatively) complex modern information
technology (IT) enabled means, which offer task- and network-level efficiency im-
provements through better scalability and systems automation. In the social network
setting, some of these enabling technologies include the Internet, mobile and satellite
phones, global positioning as well as electronic information processing, including
computerized financial, media and other information systems.
It is important to recognize, however, that—as technology frontiers move forward
—the relative scope of higher-tech and lower-tech options can and will be subject
to change. For instance, telegraph was once considered as hi-tech as cyber networks
are today, yet face-to-face meetings are and have remained a viable low-tech op-
tion throughout. Thus, for the analysis within a set timeframe, the categories consid-
ered here are designed to be complementary and mutually exclusive: with LT defined
around human and physical means—and other technologies falling into the HT cate-
gory. (For empirical analysis, the specific constitutive technologies derive from avail-
able data sources as will be exemplified by the al Qaeda communications analysis.)
Within the predictive analysis framework, this focus on the choice of commu-
nication technology provides a common approach for analyzing its diverse uses,
which can help trace out many underlying social network activities as they unfold—
potentially revealing the concealed dynamics of even clandestine terrorist organiza-
tions.
2.3 Clandestine networks
Networks typically serve to enhance organizational connectivity and communica-
tions. For example, connected networks that link different groups (sub-networks)
within an organization achieve greater competitive advantage and coordination across
many participants and large distance (Burt 2004, 2007). However, the degree of com-
munication effectiveness reflects the nature of organization’s mission and its envi-
ronment. Clandestine networks, such as those used by terrorists to organize attacks
(as well as by insurgent, espionage, and other such subversive entities), differ in
their pursuit of secret missions in hostile environments. These objectives manifest
themselves via communication technology use tactics, which tend to deviate from
the common organizational communication patterns by purposeful reliance on low-
tech approaches despite the presence of available and accessible hi-tech alternatives
(Drozdova 2008).
Such choices reflect terrorist and other clandestine organizations’ security and se-
crecy priorities (Simmel 1908; Erickson 1981; Baker and Faulkner 1993; Sageman
2004; Hoffman 2006). These priorities are enabled by strategies, which include em-
ploying sparsely connected social networks secured by compartmentalizing, coding,
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and controlling information exchange inside an organization as well as with outside
environments (e.g., Orlov 1963; Sudoplatov et al. 1994; Al Qaeda 2001). Such social
network structures and procedures limit connections and communications in order to
enhance operational security, mission execution and organization survival in the face
of hostile opponents (Ganor 2008; Drozdova 2008).
Terrorist operations exemplify covert missions, which require secrecy not only to
insure that attacks can be successfully carried out, but ultimately in order to enable
organizational survival in case of hostile detection or infiltration as well as member
dissent or mistakes. As discussed earlier, these constraints then tend to define organi-
zation’s communication technology choices. For instance, some terrorist communi-
cations reflect routine chatter or recruitment and so their tight security may not gen-
erally be considered of immediate “mission-critical” priority. Some communications,
such as propaganda, are actually overtly intended for wide distribution. In contrast,
operatives secretly preparing an attack seek fewer traces of their activity and greater
control over attack-relevant information. In the latter case, the least participants in-
volved know about each other and their clandestine mission, the more survivable their
social network is. Yet, joint tasks demand coordination and collaboration that involve
communication within the task networks and possibly with broader organizational
command and control structures. These circumstances threaten organization’s oper-
ational security and survival, ultimately making optimal communication technology
choices vital. In response, terrorist organizations attempt to limit traces by safeguard-
ing and scrambling communications, potentially making their direct and timely inter-
pretation highly challenging in the operational environment. Such attempts, however,
necessitate communications technology choices that possess certain signature char-
acteristics. These features can themselves be detected by contrasting with baseline
usage patterns and so help reveal the increase in activities leading up to an attack.
2.4 Communication technology use strategies: terrorist organizations as FINOs
Detecting covert dynamics by monitoring organization’s communication technology
choices requires understanding of how these are utilized by network organizations
that seek to limit their traceability and to survive security/secrecy failures. The effec-
tiveness of technologies employed to support and hide network organizations varies
based on the structure of the network, its operation and environment. One of the key
ways such structural differences manifest themselves is the manner in which failure
of a single node affects the rest of the network. Particularly vulnerable structures con-
tain nodes where even one single-point failure can result in potentially catastrophic
network-wide effects. These may be referred to as structurally single failure- or fault-
intolerant network organizations or “FINO”s (Drozdova 2008).
Most networks encountered in common settings are resilient to this type of single
node failure risk. They tend to increase their structural resilience through strategies
and technologies that improve their systemic reliability, including by pursuing robust-
ness through redundancies in network nodes, links, and critical functions. Examples
range from biological systems and energy infrastructures to typical business and pub-
lic sector organizations (McAdams and Arkin 1999; Carlson and Doyle 1999, 2002;
Barabási 2002; Samoilov et al. 2006; Newman et al. 2006). These systems use so-
phisticated mechanisms—whether natural or engineered—to integrate their networks
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and to disperse information in a manner that can help quickly detect and remedy unit
failures by using substitute ones. In organizational setting, such features are often
supported by largely HT technologies through connectivity, traceability, and scale
efficiency.
Terrorist networks often appear to act resilient as well (Arquilla and Ronfeldt
2001). However, their observed features can be deceptive, as networks designed for
covert operations seek to conceal their vulnerabilities. Sophisticated terrorist oper-
ations represent FINO structures, which are vulnerable to catastrophic disruptions
from individual network node—e.g. agent, cell, etc.—failure to maintain operational
security. They assume this risk to support secrecy of their subversive activities and to
insure the success of their mission. Terrorist FINOs then attempt to reduce structural
network vulnerability through strategies and technologies that increase individual
node reliability (Drozdova 2008). Because any link in the network may propagate
systemic risks, FINOs look to minimize the number of operational nodes and links.
They survive crises by disguising or destroying network units. Examples include ter-
rorist and espionage networks as well as covert partisan/guerrilla resistance, outlawed
political and certain insurgency organizations. They utilize sparse connections se-
cured as much as possible through simple, fail-safe LT technologies independent of
traceable infrastructures, relying on LT capacity for supporting node self-sufficiency
to limit organization traceability and to secure such networks against hostile oppo-
nents. Use of LT communications also helps physically limit network connectivity,
which reduces failure propagation. (E.g. it is much easier to communicate with large
numbers of people over the Internet, than through face-to-face meetings, which also
typically leave no automatic logs or other traceable records.) Thus, although an indi-
vidual node failure in a FINO can produce a catastrophic effect—low-tech strategies
build reliability into individual nodes, limit damage, and allow an organization to
recover (Drozdova 2008).
Questions may arise as to why would a terrorist organization adopt such vulnera-
ble network structures and then use low-tech technologies in an attempt to improve
robustness—particularly when more efficient and more scalable high(er)-tech options
exist? The answer lies in the nature of missions involved and their environments,
which tend to largely shape the choice. Terrorist organizations prioritize the fidelity
of mission execution over certain survivability and robustness characteristics. This
strategy is inherent in a mission where a significant portion of the organization may
be reasonably expected to be lost in the course of a successful operation (e.g., involv-
ing suicide bombers). A further need to minimize failure risk through the reduction of
the number of nodes and links also leads to diminished opportunities for maintaining
redundancy-based robustness. These and similar factors cause terrorist organizations
to largely adopt a FINO structural profile during the course of their activities. In en-
vironments dominated by hostile opponents and where there is significant resource
imbalance and incomplete information, the choice of FINO structure for clandestine
mission networks helps protect the broader organization by minimizing its internal
connectivity and allowing all parties plausible deniability of their relations.
In the case of terrorist and similar subversive networks in conflict with state actors,
resource asymmetry further contributes to FINO-type network organization choice.
Given comparatively limited resources available, optimized FINO networks tend to
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provide superior mission execution (“strike capability”) because of the more effi-
cient structure that lacks redundancy-related duplications. This lean structure allows
for more efficient mobilization and utilization of organizational resources toward
mission-critical activities. Associated vulnerabilities are then partially ameliorated
because FINO networks are more difficult to discover due to sub-network isolation—
particularly, if used in combination with less traceable communication technologies.
In this context, communication technology choices affect organizational vulner-
ability, including to intelligence collection and hostile intervention. Modern hi-tech
devices create electronic traces of organizational activity. Monitoring these traces
improves opponent’s knowledge of the FINO, increasing its risk of detection and
damage from counteraction. Alternatively, low-tech choices leave physical or so-
cial traces that may be difficult to follow in a timely manner—if at all—thus ef-
fectively concealing information about FINO vulnerabilities. Personal interactions
among agents also facilitate the establishment of shared bonds, trust and improved
understanding as well as task direction, personal oversight and loyalty. (The latter is
especially important for suicide bombing missions, which require ultimate commit-
ment from the implementers who also, by definition, lack experience at their tasks.)
That is, technology choices by FINOs influence opponents’ access to vital informa-
tion about their structure and function. This results in Darwinian-like natural selec-
tion (also discussed by Hoffman (2006) in regard to terrorist organizations’ evolu-
tion through learning) ensuring the prevalence of less traceable low-tech technology
choices among surviving covert networks.
Notably, while detailed information about a terrorist or other subversive organi-
zation may be lacking, even incomplete data obtained from monitoring such a FINO
is important. This is because if a hostile opponent were to know even partial FINO
network structure, survival strategies based on network concealment may no longer
suffice or apply. Furthermore, a FINO system—with its discussed propensity for node
isolation and lack of multiple communication channels—may be expected to repre-
sent a structure with substantially lower intrinsic dimensionality than a generic net-
work of the same size. This comparative lack of organizational complexity implies,
among other things, that even relatively high-level abstracted (as opposed to low-
level detailed) data may still be sufficient to identify key features of underlying FINO
dynamics in a manner conceptually similar to the analysis of other overtly complex,
but intrinsically low(er)-dimensional networks (e.g., Kuwahara et al. 2006, 2009).
In particular, as shown in this work, just the analysis of observable technology use
patterns can signal key information about terrorist activity direction and intent.
2.5 Propositions about terrorist communications technology use predictive signals
The FINO theoretical discussion establishes the relationship between terrorist net-
works and methods of communication used as well as provides foundations for orga-
nizational analysis based on observed technology choices. This relationship suggests
that clandestine networks, such as a terrorist group implementing an attack, will at-
tempt to limit and disguise connections as much and as long as possible—by limiting
mission-critical communications and other interactions—to evade detection. Some
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interaction, however, will be needed to coordinate the network and joint tasks. So-
phisticated operators will attempt coordination using least traceable, disguised com-
munication methods. Technologies chosen to facilitate these will not only affect at-
tack preparations, but also leave different traces, potentially distinguishable on the
LT versus HT technologies spectrum—with the former favoring human contact and
the latter relying more on advanced IT or other technological infrastructures.
Timely detection and counteraction of these attempts require early-warning sig-
nals that can indicate attack preparations and allow for the necessary lead time to
put up adequate defense counter-measures, particularly when dealing with common
terrorist attempts to attack soft—difficult to protect and/or civilian—targets. The fol-
lowing two propositions suggest how such lead time can be established by analyzing
terrorist technology use patterns and detecting the differences consistent with such
early-warning signals of potential attack:
(1) Low- versus hi-tech communications technology use patterns differ over time,
and
(2) Low-tech communications patterns signal attack preparation when tracked
against all available communications.
Empirical analysis of these dynamics requires combining LT and HT communica-
tion records despite apparent differences in their nature and collection methods. No-
tably, while intercepted HT records can be, in general, readily collected and analyzed
electronically, the alternative LT forms of communication typically require more
human-intensive methods. Thus, the availability of electronic intercepts and their
computational analysis tools may suggest that a focus only on HT records may be
more practical, efficient or otherwise advantageous. The results presented here show,
however, that HT records alone may often lack sufficient predictive power. Alterna-
tively, quantifying and combining all available information, including LT records, and
then rigorously examining the differences between LT and HT communication pat-
terns against a baseline of total communications can reveal predictive and potentially
actionable insights. The signal detection model described in this work is designed
to identify—based on empirical data—these differences, which may then be used to
predictively indicate clandestine organizational activities involved in attack prepara-
tions.
3 Analytical methods
Prominent rigorous approaches to understanding and predicting organizational and
individual behaviors use quantitative methods including computational organization
modeling, social network analysis and simulations (e.g., Carley and Prietula 1994;
Carley et al. 2002; Burton and Obel 2004), game-theoretic decision analysis (e.g.,
Cioffi-Revilla 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), and regression analysis (e.g.,
Berman et al. 2008). Modeling inputs range from simulated data to expert judgments
and empirical cross-sectional or time-series data. The resulting findings help inform
operational and policy decisions about terrorist and insurgent groups as well as other
organizations. This paper adds to existing approaches by using computational signals-
analysis methodology—in conjunction with generating and then analyzing empirical
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data on diverse organizational communications technology uses over time—to gain
further insight into emergent behaviors of terrorist organizations.
3.1 Signals analysis approach and predictive indicators
The counterterrorist early-warning challenge is to detect attack preparations based
on available records of activity, such as communications. These records may be in-
complete and involve uncertainty. Timely and accurate intelligence, specific enough
to prevent an attack, is rare. However, for predictive analysis of terrorist communica-
tions, historical technology usage patterns form the baseline against which one can
measure deviations that may offer warning signals of upcoming future attacks.
Predictive analysis estimates an entity’s future behavior based on observa-
tions over time. This challenge is not unique to counterterrorism. Corresponding
approaches—generally termed “technical analysis”—are used, for example, in fi-
nance to forecast future behavior of securities and their price fluctuations. In the
latter case, the approach assumes that the price of a security, e.g. a stock, tends to
fairly reflect the nature of the company being analyzed in its operating environment,
including industry and market conditions. The analysis then tracks price trends in
order to detect behavioral signals that tend to predict events of interest, e.g. price
increases or declines. Interpreted as indicators of tracked entity’s upcoming behavior
change, these signals may inform and guide trading and other decisions. This para-
digm is also consistent with using communications technology choices as a reflection
of terrorist organization dynamics in their environment, which includes local geopo-
litical and international conditions. By tracking terrorist communications technology
usage and applying a suitable analogue of technical analysis to the ensuing trends,
we may expect to be able to detect behavioral signals indicative of activity spikes that
could correspond to upcoming attacks. In turn, these early-warning indicators may
then be used toward informing counterterrorist actions and policy decisions through
timely monitoring.
3.2 Signal detection methodology
The predictive signal analysis approach used in this work involves plotting and com-
paring movement of two specific entities over time. The first entity tracks actual ac-
tivity levels, which in the case of finance would correspond to the recorded stock
price. In terrorist communications technology use analysis, this represents docu-
mented communication instances where the technology choice is known. The second
entity tracks the average amount of activity during a specified timeframe (e.g., daily,
monthly, quarterly, etc.) and is referred to as “Moving Average” (MA). This measure
is designed to reflect the aggregate evolution of the activity trend over time. That is,
MA provides a baseline against which we can identify any significant deviations in
activity that may be further used as predictive signals indicating an increased likeli-
hood of some characteristic behavior—whether a significant stock price move (Hull
1997), fluctuation in a biological pathway (Samoilov and Arkin 2006), or execution
of a terrorist operation (Drozdova 2008)—potentially occurring on the same time
scale in the future.
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Signals arise when the actual activity plot first crosses and then sufficiently ex-
ceeds the moving average plot. When this happens, the predictors signal an ongoing
increase in the particular behavior (e.g. stock price or communications frequency) as
it begins to significantly deviate from the level associated with the baseline pattern. If
the actual activity tracker sufficiently exceeds its MA, this would suggest that the ele-
vated state will persist for some time into the future (both due to the expected intrinsic
dynamics as well as for purely technical reasons that the alternative would imply in-
stantaneous coordinated cessation of all activities, which is essentially impossible to
achieve in complex social networks). Thus, this indicator becomes predictive of the
upcoming elevated levels of actual activity. Alternatively, when activity tracker falls
below its MA, it signals behavior decline (indicating stock decline or communica-
tions lull). Standard statistical analysis techniques, such as prediction confidence lev-
els, can be further used to ascertain what constitutes “sufficient” deviation in a given
problem context. In this context, the analysis seeks to determine a moving-average
model that will consistently predict and reliably indicate the direction of subversive
entity’s emergent behavior. The conceptual foundations described above, as well as
knowledge about the nature, behavior and environment of a particular organization
studied, inform the modeling assumptions, parameter choices, and result interpreta-
tions under uncertainty.
3.3 Technology use modeling advantages
The outlined approach systematically deals with modeling uncertainty by drawing
on current observations in the context of past behavior and broader problem under-
standing. This applies to terrorist communications analysis because communications
reflect unfolding organizational behavior where past decisions, such as technology
choices, as well as broader organizational goals, mission and environment shape on-
going social network interactions. Modeling documented instances of terrorist com-
munications technology use as a measure of organizational activity is advantageous
because it does not require knowledge of communication content—information that
may be unavailable in real time, be misleading or deceptive. Even in finance, where
companies publish annual reports and current information, details are not always im-
mediately available, complete or processed in a timely fashion. The challenge of in-
complete or misleading data sources is much greater for terrorist organizations, which
employ secrecy, security, and disinformation strategies. Thus, a forecasting approach
that does not rely on such information, but rather utilizes only the observable and doc-
umented facts of communication—such as proposed here—may be generally viewed
as having a number of advantages.
Technical analysis also benefits this approach by deriving behavior regularities
from observed data patterns and event combinations associated with the nature of
activity being modeled. In this study, predicted outcomes depend on the weighted
combination of events occurring through a certain period, as reflected by the MA-
based tracking range and the potential activity fluctuations above this level, which
makes the model structure somewhat analogous to that of Asian options used in fi-
nance (Taleb 1997; Hull 1997). Thus our method derives future predictions based on
the historical dynamics as well as current state of the organization to be modeled.
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This approach is particularly appropriate for predicting behavior of terrorist organi-
zations commonly shaped by their historical, political, social and economic context
(Crenshaw 1995).
Note that the resulting predictions are, in general, path dependent. In particular,
this means that observation density reflects how the modeled system memory (organi-
zation history) affects future forecasts. A dense path dependency weighs every piece
of information more than infrequent observations-based predictions (Taleb 1997).
For instance, a model reflects dense path-dependent features when it uses hourly or
daily short-term observation sampling, whereas monthly or quarterly sampling re-
flects longer-term behavior patterns. Shorter-term time horizons offer more granular
predictions, but they are more susceptible to erratic distortions and random noise.
Longer time horizons on the order of several months (such as quarters of a year)
generally produce more stable but less granular predictions. These features of sig-
nals analysis are next incorporated into a specific computational model for analyzing
terrorist communications technology use.
3.4 Computational model for terrorist communications signals-analysis
Our terrorist organization activity model assumes that communication records can
be parsed by technology type used. This assumption was verified empirically here
as well as in prior work (Drozdova 2008) by extracting and parsing technology use
instances from narrative descriptions that document terrorist activities over time. Se-
lected model parameters reflect the nature of the terrorist activity to be forecast and
of the data generated by measuring this activity. For instance, moving average time-
frames and communication frequency plots are consistent with the available data
granularity and knowledge or assumptions about terrorist planning horizons (see de-
tails in the Al Qaeda analysis).
Modeled entities include:
• Actual Communications (CLT/HTti ): A plot of actual LT or HT communications
technology use activity volume at each time-point/period tracked (ti ), which is
based on the data coded into the mutually-exclusive LT versus HT categories de-
fined earlier and applied to the data. (For the al Qaeda data analysis, Table 1 pro-
vides specific LT and HT category designations.)
• Tracking Range (TR): A baseline plot defined as moving average of total avail-
able communications (Total = LT + HT) plus confidence interval band based on
standard deviation estimate, which is designed to detect the sufficiently significant
deviations beyond random noise. This tracking range captures the baseline activity
by modeling the organization’s average current activity and how it evolves over
time.
• Action (Warning) Signal: A time when the actual communications tracker first
crosses the Tracking Range. As defined in (1), Action Signal is a point in time
when the actual communication level at a particular time (Cti ) exceeds its Track-
ing Range (TRti ):
Action (Warning) Signal ≡ max[CLT/HTti − TRti ,0
] (1)
with each of the components detailed below.
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The signal’s purpose is to detect a specific timeframe when communications pat-
tern reliably indicates an upcoming attack. Authorities may then use this indicator
and the underlying data points that generate the signal to focus investigation on the
timing, individuals, channels, locations and other information contained in the data
in order to facilitate attack prevention. The signal thus aims to identify actionable
and specific intelligence from broader ongoing suspect terrorist data stream. Signal
calculation derives from current and prior activity dynamics, while recognizing that
organizational activity and, particularly, covert terrorist attack preparations take time
and depend on the evolving environmental conditions as well as organizational ex-
perience and the emerging situations. To better capture these dynamics, the tracking
range model incorporates reliability or uncertainty analysis measures including con-
fidence interval and variance estimates as given in (2) for each ti :
TRti = Ati (n) + CI × c(m) ×
√
Varti (m) (2)
with subsequent equations specifying the components.
Equation (3) defines communications volume Average (A) calculated for each ti








The Confidence Interval (CI) and n parameter choices allow for the exploration
of various signal models. For instance, when n = 2 and ti is measured in quarters of
the year, each current quarter’s moving average plot point is an arithmetic average
of two previous quarters’ communication volumes. Varying CI allows, for instance,
assessment of prediction confidence—or alternatively risk and uncertainty—levels.
Correction factor, c(m), arises from an unbiased estimator of standard deviation
with small number of observations under the Normal model and rapidly approaches
one for sample sizes greater than ten (Hogg and Tanis 1977; Sveshnikov and Gelbaum
1978):




where  is the Gamma function.
Finally, Varti (m) is the variance estimate for observations at time ti , computed






(Cti−j − Ati (m))2 (5)
The choice of m depends on analysis goals and the nature of forecasting problem. For
instance, m = i means that variance analysis incorporates all available data reflecting
behavior history up to time period ti . This is desirable for forecasting the behavior
of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, which take months if not years to plan
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attacks, including the 9/11 and the United States (US) Embassy bombings in East
Africa (see e.g., USA v. UBL et al. 2001)—among others—using similar organizing
principles and communication patterns (Drozdova 2008). Additionally, incorporating
into the forecasting model the activities conducted using high- and low-tech meth-
ods is important so as not to miss valuable information, which terrorists may attempt
to compartmentalize and conceal through different technology channels. Ultimately,
signaling potential of any piece of information may become apparent only when con-
sidered alongside other activities. The model is designed to distinguish such signals in
the context of systematically measured total communications moving-average track-
ing range as well as actual LT and HT communication volumes.
3.5 Technology use data generation
If a communication is detected, the type of technology used can be extrapolated from
the means by which this communication was accomplished and so would likely be
known, particularly if the setting of communication is known. For instance, an in-
terception of an adversary’s email communication indicates that the adversary used
Internet technology. An observation of a meeting (by whatever means) implies that
the communication was conducted in person, and so forth. Low-tech communica-
tions may be more difficult to detect given the challenges of penetrating terrorist or-
ganizations, but records of such communications nonetheless show that at least some
such information is indeed available and in sufficient quantity/quality, as the al Qaeda
data analysis will demonstrate, to be successfully leveraged for signals-analysis when
combined with other data.
Table 1 Communications technology use data coding scheme
Record ID Unique identifier of communication event (datum) entered into the
database
Technology use date Finest granularity available (e.g., day, month, year)
Technology used {Specific to data} (see LT and HT examples below)
Technology/traceability
type (LT v. HT)
Low-Tech/Low-Traceability (LT)—use depends on human/physical
interaction—example technology type instances include: {meeting in per-
son; courier or intermediary; handwritten notes and other paper ex-
changes; printed newspaper or magazine, etc.; physical mail, exchange
or shipment}
Hi-Tech/High-Traceability (HT)—use depends on technological
equipment/infrastructure—example technology type instances include:
{audio/video recording; computer; computer disk; encryption; fax;
financial system; Internet; mobile phone; newswire systems; photo;
radio; satellite phone; satellite TV network; telephone; TV network}
Short description of the
communication event
Short description of the communication event for which technology was
used including topic, participants, locations and other context as available
Source quote Quote from the data source where technology use datum was obtained
Reference Data source reference
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Systematic coding procedures (Table 1) ensure reliable extraction of quantifiable
technology-use data adequate for signals analysis. This coding reflects the assorted
specific documented technologies used—such as a meeting in person, interactions
via an intermediary or courier, by mail, telephone, fax, mobile phone, satellite phone,
email, Internet posting, television broadcast, other information systems and so on.
These communication means are very different, but each represents an instance of
technology use, as discussed. Such technology use records may also derive from dif-
ferent sources, e.g., from real-time electronic traces and audio or video capture to
human observation or text narrations describing the organization and its operations.
Because organizations use such different means and the available data collections
also vary, it is important to combine and analyze available records together in order
to obtain the most inclusive palette of organizational communications. This is espe-
cially desirable for analyzing terrorist activities, whose records tend to be inherently
limited, uncertain and possibly misleading as terrorists attempt to evade detection.
(Sophisticated terrorist and other clandestine organizations also train their agents
to provide misinformation and resist interrogations if captured.) A common unit of
analysis is thus needed for systematically extracting and combining analyzable data
from heterogeneous sources.
A documented instance of communications technology use provides such a unit
for culling uniform data from diverse sources and collecting it into a database for
analysis. Together, the resulting structured data reflect the timing, types and objec-
tive characteristics of the technologies used. Where available, data entries should
also include descriptive context, which is not necessary for signal detection but may
provide helpful background for interpreting results. The range of specific technolo-
gies coded reflects the documented instances available in data sources. The data are
further aggregated into the mutually exclusive HT and LT categories to explore the
propositions.
3.6 Analytic process summary
The following steps summarize the workflow (Fig. 1) and provide the pseudo-code
for predictive signals analysis of terrorist communications technology use:
(1) Identify data sources containing documented communications technology use
events over time.
(2) Extract communications technology use data using Table 1 categories and code
into a database.
(3) Encode the mathematical model equations for computational data analysis.
(4) Analyze data to identify early warning signals.
Specifically, compute and plot actual as well as moving average activities, seek-
ing signals where actual activity sufficiently exceeds the tracking range mod-
eled at the appropriate prediction confidence and signal variance levels. Include
known attacks covered by the data on the plot in order to determine which sig-
nals consistently precede attacks and thus can serve as early-warning indicators
for future forecasts based on current data.
(5) Compile results and conduct sensitivity analysis.
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Fig. 1 Terrorist communications technology use signals analysis steps and workflow
In particular, confidence interval (CI) may be adjusted to examine prediction fi-
delity. A higher CI provides higher-fidelity predictions, but a tracking range with
higher CI would likely capture fewer signals (fewer potential false-positives).
A lower CI may generate more uncertain predictions, while identifying more
likely warning signals (fewer potential false-negatives). In this manner, CI pro-
vides a means for systematic analysis of these tradeoffs and associated uncer-
tainties aimed to assists with evaluating operational and policy courses of action.
Other variable model parameters include the size of data windows used for Mov-
ing Average and variance computation—i.e. n and m, respectively.
(6) Draw conclusions as well as explore possible operational, strategic, policy, and
other applications or implications.
The outlined approach was used to generate predictive signals of al Qaeda attacks
using Excel for computational analysis, as described next.
4 Al Qaeda data
4.1 Sources
Narratives by and about al Qaeda, documenting the organization’s goals, operations
and environment over time, were used as raw data sources. The three main ones
covered 1994–2003 al Qaeda activities from different perspectives—al Qaeda’s own,
news media, and US Government:
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(1) Al Qaeda statements and media publications collected by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency’s (CIA) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) into a “Compi-
lation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994–January 2004” (FBIS 2004). This two
hundred and seventy seven page source contains about ninety nine narrative records
translated into English. These include al Qaeda official announcements, messages,
writings, speeches by and media interviews with Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and other
al Qaeda leaders and members. This information contains descriptions of the organi-
zation structures, goals, ideology, procedures, customs, training, recruitment, attack
operations, and members’ daily life as well as reflections on current events, plans and
aspirations. The original information was created and disseminated by various tech-
nology means. The materials include, for example, a “Declaration of Jihad Against
the Americans” by UBL from Hindu Kush, Afghanistan, received by fax and pub-
lished in Arabic by London-based Al-Islah. They also include messages from and
transcripts of conversations with UBL recorded during meetings in person as well
as delivered by al Qaeda couriers to local or global media outlets or published on al
Qaeda affiliated websites. FBIS monitored, collected and translated the information
as it appeared. (In 2005 FBIS became a part of the “Open Source Center” established
by the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI 2005.) Communications technology
use instances were extracted and coded from these descriptions.
(2) Legal records documenting al Qaeda’s background and activities as part of
the indictment in the case of (USA v. UBL et al. 1998, 2001). The source of this
narrative evidence is the one hundred and fifty seven page indictment supported by
the official transcripts of the subsequent trial (USA v. UBL et al. 1998, 2001). The
original indictment was filed in 1998, documenting al Qaeda history, participants and
operations prior to and leading up to 9/11. The US government made the indictment
with updates and trial transcripts publicly available. These official US legal docu-
ments maintain high standards of fact. In particular, this evidence can be deemed to
be largely free from possible interrogation duress, as it would otherwise be generally
found inadmissible in the US court of law, which was not the case during the trial.
Technology use events were coded from the indictment, which includes activities and
“overt acts” based on background intelligence, investigations, and material evidence
available prior to 9/11.
(3) Description of al Qaeda operations from inception and to 9/11 based on the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commis-
sion) Final Report (2004). This narrative source is the five hundred and sixty seven
page official report issued by the Commission. The timeframe covers Al Qaeda’s
renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998)—after earlier operating out of Sudan—and at-
tacks orchestrated in part from Afghanistan with the support of operatives, cells, safe
houses, funding, recruiting, propaganda venues, and other terrorist support structures
around the world. Resulting data are based on the report’s multiple sources, including
government investigations and intelligence, national security officials’ testimony, me-
dia and other sources referenced in the report. Technology use data in this case were
coded from the description of al Qaeda activities (pp. 63–253) and focused on the
information available prior to 9/11 but not recognized in time to prevent the attack.
Taken together, these sources create a continuous record of al Qaeda activities
from different and complementary perspectives, which contains information available
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over time and at each consecutive time period modeled. By deriving time-stamped
data from such sources and modeling it using the signals-analysis approach described
here—with each time point plotted reflecting events that occurred during the corre-
sponding period—we can significantly approximate analysis of the intelligence ac-
quired in near real time. Then, “tracking” so generated communications history and
its moving averages (that incorporate prior intelligence available up to each time-
period modeled) provides an estimate of “typical” baseline activity observations—to
Table 2 Al Qaeda timeline and events summary covered by the data
Timeline Summary of Key Al Qaeda Developments Covered by the Data
1994 Usama bin Laden (UBL) resides in Sudan. UBL and associates establish a London office
designed to publicize statements and provide cover for violent/military activities. Al Qaeda
operatives discuss potential attacks on US Embassies and other targets (USA v. UBL et al.
1998, 2001).
1995 Al Qaeda’s “Bojinka” plot—the intended bombing of 12 US commercial jumbo jets over
the Pacific during two days, organized in part by Khaled Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) (9/11
Commission 2004)— is discovered and prevented. KSM later uses elements of this plot in
the 9/11 attack design.
1996 UBL and other Al Qaeda members relocate to Afghanistan and declare war on the US
and its allies. On June 25, 1996, a large truck-bomb explodes at the Khobar Towers com-
plex housing US Air Force personnel in Saudi Arabia (19 Americans are killed and 372
wounded). Saudi Hezbollah, Iran and Al Qaeda are implicated in the attack (9/11 Com-
mission 2004). Al Qaeda praises the attack (FBIS 2004). The first of future 9/11 pilots on
record as arriving in the US returns to the US after being absent since early 1990s (Mueller
2002).
1997 Al Qaeda’s East Africa cell members meet with and receive funding from Al Qaeda leaders
in Afghanistan (USA v. UBL et al. 1998, 2001).
1998 On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda operatives use truck laden with explosives and driven by
suicide-bombers to nearly simultaneously attack US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing at least 213 and 11 individuals respectively and causing
thousands of injuries as well as property destruction (9/11 Commission 2004).
1999 An Al Qaeda operative prepares to bomb Los Angeles airport on or about the upcoming
New Year’s day of 2000 but is arrested while crossing the US-Canada border with concealed
explosives. Al Qaeda prepares to bomb US Navy destroyer USS The Sullivans in the Yemeni
port of Aden using an explosives-filled boat. Al Qaeda operatives plan to meet in Malaysia
(9/11 Commission 2004).
2000 In January, 2000, the attack on the USS The Sullivans commences but the boat prematurely
sinks. The plot thus fails, but is not detected. On October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda uses the same
method to successfully attack the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden killing
17 members of the ship’s crew and wounding at least 40. Also in 2000, Al Qaeda operatives
and two of the future 9/11 hijackers meet in Malaysia. The future 9/11 pilots continue to
train in the US and other attack preparations unfold in Afghanistan, United States, Europe,
and elsewhere (9/11 Commission 2004).
2001 9/11 support hijackers (so called “muscle”, i.e. attackers who were not pilots) arrive in the
US, the attackers complete final preparations, and the 9/11 attack occurs killing nearly 3000
individuals in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania (9/11 Commission 2004).
2002 A video—including the Al Qaeda organization claim of responsibility for 9/11 and showing
UBL and other Al Qaeda members lauding the 9/11 hijackers and the attack—appears and
is widely disseminated by the media (FBIS 2004).
2003 UBL continues to call for violence against the US (FBIS 2004).
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Table 3 Coded data examples
Record ID 318 254
Technology use
date
On or about January 5, 2000 November 28, 2002




LT: Low-tech/Low-traceability HT: Hi-tech/High-traceability
Short description Al Qaeda operatives including future
9/11 hijackers meet in Malaysia
Al Qaeda-affiliated website posts Us-
ama Bin Laden’s message
Source quote “After completing his casing mission,
Khallad [a future USS Cole operation
participant] returned to Kuala Lumpur.
Hazmi [a future 9/11 hijacker] arrived
in Kuala Lumpur soon thereafter . . . Mi-
hdhar [a future 9/11 hijacker] arrived
on January 5, probably one day after
Hazmi. All . . . stayed at the apartment
of Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian JI [Je-
maah Islamiya] member . . . According
to Khallad, he and Hazmi spoke about
the possibility of hijacking planes and
crashing them or holding passengers as
hostages . . . Khallad admits being aware
at the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar
were involved in an operation involving
planes in the United States”
“London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic 28
Nov 02 p1 [Unattributed report: “Bin
Ladin in a Special Message to the ‘Peo-
ple of the Peninsula’: Take up Arms To
Defend Your Honor. Warned of Critical
Days and All-out- War”] [FBIS Trans-
lated Text] London, Al-Quds al-Arabi—
An Internet website close to Al-Qa’ida
Organization has carried a new message
from Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, which
it said was brought by one of the se-
nior mujahidin who has returned from
Afghanistan. The message calls on the
people of the Arabian Peninsula in par-
ticular to get ready to face critical days
and an all-out war.”
Reference The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004,
p. 159. (The Report also documents that
Hazmi and Mihdhar were 9/11 hijack-
ers and this meeting was known to US
intelligence prior to 9/11)
Note: The information in square paren-
theses, [ ], is added for clarification and
is not part of the original source quote.
FBIS Report, “Compilation of Usama
Bin Laden Statements 1994–January
2004”, January 2004, p. 230. FBIS De-
scription of Source: “London Al-Quds
al-Arabi in Arabic—London-based in-
dependent Arab nationalist daily with
an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial
line; generally pro-Palestinian, pro-Iraqi
regime, tends to be sympathetic to Bin
Ladin.”
which current intelligence can be compared in search for warning signals of ongoing
attack preparations in a real operational scenario. We also can, in general, assume
the resulting data to be incomplete and uncertain, which is likewise a situation com-
mensurate with real intelligence work. Furthermore, as the sources used here pursued
their own objectives unrelated to acquiring technology use statistics—that is, they
were not focused on communications technology use per se, but only happened to
include technology use records alongside other information—the extracted data may
be fairly taken to be un-biased by and for the purposes of this analysis.
Finally, the timeframe covered by the sources considered here, includes activities
before, during, and after several Al Qaeda attacks (summarized in Table 2). This
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provides a rich temporal dataset reflecting communications available prior to attacks
which were nevertheless not prevented.
4.2 Data description
The data sources generated four hundred and ninety six specific communication tech-
nology use instances (Total N = 496) coded per Table 1 guidelines. Table 3 provides
structured LT and HT data entry examples. Also, Fig. 2 presents the data by technol-
ogy type used as a percent of monthly and all data.
5 Al Qaeda analysis and findings
5.1 Modeling assumptions and parameters
The computational parameters used in the model reflect available data granularity
and assumptions about al Qaeda. Data were aggregated by each quarter-of-year, with
the analysis assuming at least half-a-year attack preparation timeframe. This latter
assumption is empirically justified and consistent with al Qaeda operations known to
take several months or years to prepare major attacks, including target casing, logis-
tics, recruitment, funding, training, and implementation. For instance, target surveil-
lance in Nairobi for the future 1998 attacks on US Embassies in East Africa began in
1993, and teams that were to carry out the attacks were being convened in Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam by early 1998 (9/11 Commission 2004). Similarly, 9/11 preparations
spanned several years. For example, as discussed, at least one of the 9/11 pilots (Han-
jour) was active in the United States since 1991, and he trained at Arizona Aviation in
1998 (Mueller 2002). UBL supported KSM’s plan to use aircraft as weapons in 1999,
a planning meeting involving future hijackers occurred in early 2000 in Malaysia, pi-
lots’ training in US flight schools continued in 2000, muscle hijackers arrived in the
United States starting in April 2001, apparent surveillance flights occurred between
May and August and final meetings by groups assigned to each plane occurred within
days of September 11, 2001 (Mueller 2002; 9/11 Commission 2004).
To account for possible early warning signals among communication records re-
flecting these activities, the model confidence interval was set to explore more signals
with a threshold for signals to incorporate at least two-thirds of the standard devia-
tion (CI = 0.66 under the Normal model) in the potentially noisy communications
data. Higher CI can provide higher confidence signals, but risks missing less precise
yet still useful warnings of potential attacks. The ability to vary this parameter of-
fers a tool for exploring operational and policy relevant risks and tradeoffs. Based
on assumptions and data granularity, the moving average used in the tracking range
model spanned activity for two latest quarters (n = 2 in (2)). The tracking range in-
corporates historical dynamics by measuring communications variance over the Total
(LT + HT) data available up to each corresponding quarter i (m = i in (2)). Figure 3
shows activities and attacks covered by the data—with the former corresponding to
total as well as actual LT and HT communication levels used to examine possible
signals. Figures 4 and 5 include the tracking range plot as well as, respectively, LT
and HT communication levels.











































Early-warning detection of attack signals from terrorist organizations 81
Fig. 3 Al Qaeda communications technology use data
5.2 Initial empirical findings
Finding 1: Al Qaeda communications fluctuate over time. With communications
technology use patterns reflecting major organizational activities—as may be seen in
Fig. 3—actual communications volumes peaked around the time of major attacks—
the US Embassy bombings (August 7, Q3 1998) and 9/11 (September 11, Q3 2001).
Other communication volume data peaks, however, do not correspond to attacks,
and other attacks occurred at times that do not correspond to data peaks, e.g., on
Khobar Towers (June 25, Q2 1996) and USS Cole (October 12, Q4 2000).
Finding 2: LT and HT communication patterns differ. LT peaks occur ahead of major
attacks and earlier than HT peaks (Fig. 3). HT peaks closely correspond to the timing
of major attacks. This suggests that LT communications patterns, if detected, may
act as leading indicators or predictors of terrorist attacks, whereas HT peaks occur at
the time of attacks and detecting them may be too late for prevention or disruption.
(This finding supports Proposition 1 in Section 2.5).
Finding 3: LT communications generate signals. The LT communications plot gener-
ates signals when it crosses and exceeds the tracking range, where signal strength is
determined by the confidence interval band above the moving average incorporated
into the tracking range (Fig. 4).
Finding 4: LT signals consistently occur before attacks thereby providing early
warnings (Fig. 4). As our analysis seeks to identify behaviors that consistently occur
before attacks and so can serve as predictive early warning signals, we have looked
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Fig. 4 Al Qaeda’s low-tech communications technology use indicators offer consistent early-warning
signals of attacks
to identify them based on the available activity data. LT signals occur before attacks
suggesting that they can be used in early-warning indicators. At least one LT signal
precedes each of the attacks in the dataset. Lead signals for the “simultaneous” 1998
and 2001 attacks each precede the respective attack by about two quarters (four-to-
six months by modeled data granularity). In each of these attacks, several different
locations were targeted at the same time: the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia in 1998, and the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, and a third target
for which the intended hijacked plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field in 2001. The
signal timeframe corresponds to the attack plans entering their execution phases.
(Additionally, an earlier Q4 1996 signal precedes the Embassies attack potentially
indicating more advanced planning.) Relatively weaker but still detectable LT sig-
nals also precede smaller-scale attacks in this dataset: an LT signal occurs about
one quarter (one-to-three months) before the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, and a dif-
ferent LT signal occurs about four quarters (ten-to-twelve months) before the USS
Cole attack. The longer lead time in the latter may refer to extended preparations
first intended for an earlier unsuccessfully attempted USS The Sullivans bombing
plot later executed against the USS Cole. (This finding supports Proposition 2 in
Section 2.5).
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Fig. 5 Al Qaeda’s hi-tech communications do not generate signals by this model
Finding 5: HT communications do not generate early-warning signals within the
context of this model (Fig. 5). By not rising above the tracking range, HT here does
not provide desired warnings. Furthermore, HT activity peaks during attacks, which
suggests that detecting it may be too late to attempt prevention. The timing indicates
that this HT activity may, for example, involve chatter by organizational participants
or sympathizers reacting to the attacks, rather than operational activity of the sub-
network organizing the attack. HT data are nonetheless important as they contribute
to the tracking range that helps reveal predictive LT signals. (Other approaches to
analyzing HT chatter may be explored should additional data become available.)
5.3 Predictive applications to future attack prevention
Each early-warning signal indicates an opportunity to detect—among other sus-
pected terrorist communications data streams—the interactions of the operational
network involved in attack preparation. Greater data granularity may offer more pre-
cisely timed signals with, potentially, higher confidence. In contrast, signals on larger
time scales may provide earlier warnings of the unfolding attack plans. Overall, the
signals-analysis methodology presented here is designed to aid the detection and pre-
vention of potential future attacks based on behavior regularities established by terror-
ist organizations and manifested via tracked communications technology use patterns
over time and on the relevant time scale. Should additional context surrounding the
communication technology use instances be recorded as part of the data (per Table 1),
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Fig. 6 Envisioned signals-analysis model use for analyzing past and current intelligence toward future
attack detection and prevention based on terrorist communications technology use patterns. In this manner,
the model may assist with identification of impending attacks, especially when calibrated on additional
data (e.g. for greater precision, range of attacks, or terrorist organizations other than al Qaeda). In this
forward-looking application, the past and current data will be used to model the tracking range against
which current signals, if detected, can help focus investigation on activities consistent with upcoming
attacks in order to help locate the suspects and improve prevention chances. Specifically, a detected signal
will first indicate the upcoming attack timing—as based on the time-window determined for the available
data granularity and modeling assumptions. This indicator could then further serve to focus investigations
on individual target candidates, who will be profiled through their technology use links and activities—as
identified in the data that produced the original signal
this signal-associated information may also point to location, target or other details
that may further help reveal impending threats. Figure 6 outlines such potential pre-
dictive applications of our model.
6 Conclusion: toward operational and policy applications
The presented signals-analysis approach allows identification of terrorist attack pre-
cursors based on observed communications technology use patterns. The findings
support broad theoretical propositions about differential use of advanced IT enabled
hi-tech versus traditional socially and physically enabled low-tech communication
means—with the former allowing greater efficiency on a large scale across distance,
and the latter supporting greater secrecy by impeding the traces of clandestine net-
works in hostile environments. Our empirical results regarding al Qaeda communica-
tions also demonstrate the use of practical methods for detecting leading indicators of
attacks. Specifically, the tracking range method captures ongoing organizational dy-
namics and historical activity patterns as a baseline against which attack signals can
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be detected, e.g., when clandestine activity patterns of individuals involved in attack
preparation begin to deviate from typical organizational communications. We found
that tracking ongoing low-tech communications activity can serve to identify consis-
tent early-warning signals predictive of terrorist attacks, whereas a similar approach
does not appear to produce meaningful results for hi-tech communications alone.
Signals emerge as covert attack communication patterns begin to sufficiently di-
verge from baseline chatter. The inherently less traceable low-tech communications
offer additional security for clandestine interactions, and thus low-tech communica-
tions were examined separately from hi-tech. Results show that empirical low- versus
hi-tech communications technology use patterns indeed differ over time and in terms
of their predictive potential. Hi-tech activity does not generate predictive signals via
this model, but low-tech signals provide early warnings by consistently preceding and
indicating upcoming attacks. The detected low-tech signals based on the available al
Qaeda data consistently offer at least three-to-six months advanced warning for the
attacks covered by these data. These signals correspond to stages of known al Qaeda
operational patterns, where attack preparations involve advanced target scoping and
later implementation, which are often done by different teams. A review of the under-
lying al Qaeda activity records shows that the signals identified by the model indeed
correspond to participants’ use of low-traceability methods (e.g. involving physical
communications), which is consistent with clandestine networks’ security strategies.
This covert activity increases leading up to attacks as tasks require more coordina-
tion but secrecy requires trace concealment. To insure that the detected signals of this
covert activity are not mere coincidences, the signals-analysis approach incorporates
organization theory about clandestine networks with empirical modeling informed
by substantive knowledge about actual terrorist and other subversive organizations.
The model also incorporates parameters and confidence interval terms which can be
varied to explore prediction reliability levels and uncertainty involved in modeling
clandestine networks.
The overall approach aims to support intelligence assessments and offer the coun-
terterrorist authorities a capability to further curb terrorist concealment options across
the entire spectrum of technologies and tactics they may use. For instance, should the
terrorists abandon their tried-and-tested low-tech tactics in an attempt to circumvent
low-tech signals detection and turn instead to greater utilization of hi-tech channels
for their mission-critical communications—this shift would only increase their net-
work vulnerability. This result is expected due to the deleterious effects of the connec-
tive, traceable hi-tech means on the clandestine fault-intolerant network organization
(FINO) structure discussed theoretically in this work as well as supported by the em-
pirical analysis (Drozdova 2008). That is, a terrorist use of hi-tech channels for covert
mission-critical operations would only play into the counterterrorist hand by mak-
ing clandestine activities more readily traceable, particularly by the predominantly
hi-tech means employed by various United States security agencies. Alternatively,
should terrorists continue to rely on low-tech methods, the signals analysis capability
that utilizes the computational model developed here offers a way to harness compu-
tational hi-tech tools toward the low-tech terrorist activity detection. Thus, this ap-
proach looks to help deny and better counter the technologically asymmetric threats
that use low-tech against technologically superior hi-tech defenses.
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Additionally, the availability of more and higher-granularity data may support
more precise signals and closer early-warning timeframes than identified by this
analysis so far. There is a tradeoff, however: earlier signals offer earlier warnings and
thus more time for detailed investigation, but earlier stages of attack preparation may
contain less specific evidence and lead to signals of lower reliability. Alternatively,
warnings closer to the attack occurrence may be more precise, but leave less time
for investigation and action risking prevention failure. Notably, this ability to detect
both advanced and closer lead signals may actually support broader counterterror-
ist action options. For instance, authorities may first use the advanced early signals
to track down potential broader organizational structures and links to higher-value
targets without immediately disrupting the detected plot. They may then act more
directly against those tasked with carrying out the plot in order to prevent the attack
itself. By further utilizing more detailed and current data as well as systematically
exploring alternative courses of action with their associated costs and tradeoffs, this
approach may practically contribute to the intelligence analysis toolkit supporting
operational and policy decision-making.
Finally, this work contributes techniques for quantitative predictive analysis of
terrorist behavior based on empirical data as well as theoretical insights into re-
lationships between network organizations and their technology use choices, espe-
cially for clandestine missions in hostile environments. Common technology use
unit of analysis supports combining heterogeneous multi-source intelligence data—
including those on electronically- as well as human-detectable communications—
and robustly assessing their relative predictive power for timely threat detection and
response. Predictive power of the so established low-tech indicators of impending
threats can be understood within the context of covert social networks’ need to rely on
the low-tech and low-traceability technologies when attempting to not only evade US
hi-tech intelligence means and defenses, but also limit their organization-wide dam-
age propagation from security failures that do occur. Results of this work contribute
analytical tools and potentially actionable findings toward uncovering such hostile
organizations. The underlying model and empirical approach also aim to contribute
novel tools and understandings toward the study of organizations, social networks,
and international as well as national security challenges.
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